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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
SHIFTING THE ULTIMATUM: POLITICAL ALIENATION AND PARTICIPATION 
 
Common knowledge dictates that cynicism and mistrust of politics is rampant 
among US citizens, wreaking havoc on participation in the American political process. 
Social Capital theories are commonly used to effectively explain US political behavior, 
but fail to account for alienation from the political process or the influence of peers. I 
argue that models of political participation would be improved by the inclusion of 
political alienation variables, which have fallen into disuse in recent decades. Using data 
from the US Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey (2006), this paper relies 
upon negative binomial regression with nested models to compare the explanatory power 
of social capital variables with models including political alienation and peer influence 
variables to assess the value of such concepts. Results indicate that while the parent 
variables of political alienation (powerlessness, meaninglessness, and mistrust of political 
institutions) improve model accuracy and influence political participation, the latent 
variable remains ambiguously useful. Powerlessness and mistrust revealed significant 
effects, but mistrust failed to fit into the latent concept of political alienation, and 
meaninglessness did not produce significant results. Peer influence only significantly 
affected political participation when participants specifically discussed political matters 
with peers. Implications and concepts for future research follow. 
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I. Research Questions 
It is enough that the people know there was an election. The people who cast the 
votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything. - Joseph 
Stalin 
Politics is not like an ocean voyage or a military campaign… something which leaves 
off as soon as reached. It is not a public chore to be gotten over with. It is a way of 
life. - Plutarch  
The quotes above demonstrate two ideas which, on the surface, appear to conflict. 
The first, the hopelessness of the political process. The other speaks of the deep 
importance of a lifelong connection to the political process. In the habit of famous 
quotations, both are attributed to key historical figures, but despite their historical 
context, these two attributions also point to a very real divide in public discourse and 
perspectives of politics. In the United States, citizens are frequently faced with 
conflicting accounts of the state of US politics, which at any given time appear to be 
simultaneously ripe for activism, hopeless, corrupt, and most recently, experiencing a 
crisis of legitimacy and engagement.1  
News articles indicate a youth culture which, paradoxically, is both disconnected 
from politics and more active than ever, painting confusing images of a future rife with 
autocracy or democratic overload and indecision. Public information polls indicate 
tumultuous rates of political participation across every demographic category, 
contradicted by government data indicating downward long-term trends (US Census 
2006). What these accounts tell us is that the current state of political participation is 
difficult for an average consumer to evaluate definitively. With a majority of public 
accounts focusing on simple voting rates (among the least demanding political acts), 
                                                            
1 Krippner, Greta R. Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2011. Print. 
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long-term data regarding more complicated modes of participation are detrimentally 
sparse.  
The research problem, then, can be summarized by the following statements: first, 
that popular discourse about political participation is highly conflicting, and often biased. 
Second, there appears to be a trend indicating that the United States is suffering a deficit 
in democratic activity. Finally, there is evidence that the United States is currently facing 
a crisis of legitimacy which has been increasing in the face of the 2008 Great Recession, 
with clear intra- and inter-party divisions inhibiting government function. This is 
problematic because it indicates that the state of politics is broadly interpreted in a 
negative light, raising important questions about the genuine rate at which Americans are 
giving up on the political system. Unfortunately, properly functioning democratic 
systems of government rely on engaged citizens. 
Nina Eliasoph summarized the logical concerns best when she noted that: 
“… In many polls, the winner is ‘don’t know,’ ‘no response,’ or 
opinions based on incorrect information. This endless abyss of political 
ignorance has long plagued democratic theory: if people don’t know anything, 
surely they cannot be responsible citizens. And if one really believes that the 
majority of people are too dumb and uncaring to participate in politics, the 
bottom falls out of the whole idea of democracy.”(1998) 
Based on this idea, the first inclination may be to look to democratic theory for answers. 
However, the nature of this theory does not account for the influences on behavior that 
are the hallmark of sociological works. Analyses often work on the state or institutional 
level, which, while legitimate, is beyond the scope of this project (Janoski et al. 2005). 
Those ideas that are applied at the individual level are based more in psychological work 
and reasoning, which does not generally take the external-influence approach assumed by 
sociologists (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980).  
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The purpose of this study is to use the 2006 United States Citizenship, 
Involvement, and Democracy Survey to assess whether the underlying concepts of 
political alienation have a uniformly negative effect on political activity. More 
specifically, the question this research intends to address is as follows: 
To what extent does political alienation affect one’s amount of political 
participation, and is this effect moderated by peer influence?  
 Thus, the goal of this study is not necessarily to predict or explain political 
behavior broadly. Such has been attempted by countless other researchers, and I do not 
presume to be able to provide better explanation than their collective voices. Instead, I 
intend to provide an image of the extent to which Political Alienation, as compared to 
other common explanatory factors, can significantly influence behavioral outcomes. A 
key component of this study will also consider the effects of peer influence. Peer 
influence is well understood to affect political behavior among political scientists, but 
sociologists devote surprisingly little time directly examining this element (though this is 
changing as social network research is growing in sociology).  Examining both of these 
features of socio-political life will allow us to better predict the extent to which political 
alienation may be influencing political behavior, which can be useful in efforts to 
mobilize citizens.  
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II. Historical Context 
Though concerns about political participation are not often (in popular media) 
discussed in terms of alienation, I find that we hear of this issue more commonly through 
“mistrust of” and “cynicism” regarding the government (concepts which are empirically 
similar to components of political alienation). While cynicism and mistrust began to float 
into the minds of young Americans during the Vietnam War, it made its home in the 
collective conscience of the American public with the Watergate scandal and President 
Richard Nixon's subsequent impeachment. These two series of events demonstrated 
clearly that elected representatives may act on personal agendas, rather than on behalf of 
their constituencies. Since then, dissatisfaction with and mistrust of the government has 
risen slowly but fairly steadily reaching a peak across 2012 and 2013, when partisanship 
and ideology crippled Congress to the point of gridlock. Given that these ideas may be 
connected with a sense of political alienation, my study will take a snapshot of this 
political climate, from 2005, and use a cross-sectional analysis to demonstrate the extent 
to which alienation may influence political participation. 
These historical developments have correlated with concerns about a general lack 
of faith in politics, with the media often citing declining election participation rates as an 
example (Figure 1). And certainly voter turnout has dwindled, though the higher rates 
seen in the last three presidential elections raise some questions regarding how ‘long 
term’ the statistical descent is. While the drop in Congressional election voter turnout is 
somewhat masked by the large spikes that accompany Presidential election years, the 
downward trend is still noticeable and thus worthy of the examination and concern it has 
drawn. 
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*Linear indicators used solely to illustrate downward long-term trend, and do not represent a 
regression analysis. 
Source: International IDEA 
However, this is also relevant to the context of the data for this project. The 
Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey collected data during 2005, shortly 
after the 2004 re-election of Republican President George W. Bush, during a war initially 
meant to be a short-term operation. The 2004 election was somewhat close, but hardly a 
nail-biter. Bush won the election with 50.73% of the popular vote, which put him nearly 
2.5 percentage points ahead of John Kerry, who pulled in 48.27% of the popular vote 
(FEC.gov, 2004). This time, there was no need for ballot recounts or court decisions – the 
results were clear. Yet as the Iraq War dragged on, concerns about its effects increased. 
From 2004 to 2006, feelings that sending troops to Iraq was a mistake increased from 
42% of respondents agreeing to 53% of respondents (Iraq: Gallup, Inc.). Along with 
growing concerns about other policy issues, President Bush’s approval ratings 
dramatically declined, reaching their lowest levels in the mid-30 percent area (Gallup, 
Inc.). Though not indicated in this survey data, Bush’s approval would continue to drop 
34.00%
39.00%
44.00%
49.00%
54.00%
59.00%
64.00%
1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004 2014
Figure 1. Percentage of Eligable Voter Turnout by 
Year
(Voting Age Population)
Presidential
Congressional
Linear (Presidential)
Linear (Congressional)
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to its lowest (around 25%) until the end of his second term (Gallup, Inc.). Meanwhile, 
this same time period also saw notably low Congressional approval ratings (dropping 20 
points to about 24% approval from 2004 to 2006), as voters became disillusioned in the 
wake of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and the failure to address domestic policy issues 
(Gallup, Inc.). This was part of the cause of the Democratic Party ‘takeover’ of Congress 
in the 2006 election, when Democrats gained a majority in the House of Representatives 
(controlling 233 of the 435 seats), the Senate, and a number of other elected bodies 
(FEC.gov, 2006). All of these factors would influence the political climate in which this 
survey was gathered, and may subsequently influence the respondents’ responses. Such 
tumultuous times could also directly affect whether a respondent may experience short-
term alienation from their government, and thus potentially their political participation. 
Such short-term shifts may fluctuate with the administration in power (if the respondent 
supported or opposed an administration), though there is evidence for some long-term 
stability in types of alienation. 
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III. Literature Review 
In order to fully understand the concepts I intend to analyze, it is important to 
examine the research preceding my own. In particular, this can provide conceptual 
clarity, or at least outline the lack of consensus that may exist on a topic. In this spirit, the 
following chapter will do four things. First, it will provide us with an outline of the 
concept of political participation, addressing the questions of who participates, why they 
do so, and what political participation actually refers to. The second section will examine 
my primary independent variable: political alienation. It will cover some of the history of 
this concept’s use, and how ti tends to be treated in empirical works. The third will focus 
on Social Capital, its theoretical origins, and relationship with political activity. The last 
section will consider empirical findings regarding political participation, and some of the 
many ways that one’s social context can affect their political engagement. 
Political Participation - What, Who, Why 
While explaining political participation is not the goal of this study, per se (the 
goal in this case being to see whether Alienation can improve attempts to explain this 
series of acts), it is important to have an understanding of what does influence this 
variable. Given that political participation is arguably one of the most studied topics in 
social science, there is a great deal of information on this topic, and it is not confined to 
the works of political scientists (Kourvetaris & Dobratz 1982). Sociologists, too, have 
weighed in on political participation, and for the purpose of this section I will focus on 
three simple questions: 1) What constitutes participation, 2) who participates in politics, 
and 3) why? 
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First is the issue of what constitutes participation. This is important not only for 
the purpose of focusing this commonly-used term, but also so that I can better 
operationalize the concept for use in my analysis. Most often, political participation 
includes the basic act of voting, and this remains a heavily-used measure. Bolzendahl and 
Coffe (2013) also divide participation between formal and informal acts, which range 
from voting and party membership to “political activism”, all of which includes whether 
a respondent had signed a petition; taken part in a demonstration; attended a political 
meeting or rally; contacted a politician; donated money or raised funds; bought or 
boycotted goods for political/ethical/environmental reasons; contacted media; joined an 
internet political forum.  
While some may argue that activism or social movements may not constitute 
political engagement, many aspects of activism (sharing information, protesting/ 
demonstrating, boycotting) are included in measure of political participation.2 This 
expanded view of political participation illustrates an issue observed by Walder (2009), 
that social movements and political sociological literatures may converge at certain 
points as “For [activists], protest was a political activity that was as rational and goal 
directed as routine politics.” This echoes Fisher who noted that political activism and 
electoral politics constitute “conceptually distinct [but] empirically connected aspects of 
contemporary American politics” (2012). There are just a few studies using similar 
measure of political participation or engagement, but they serve to demonstrate that 
participation often goes beyond voting or formal (institutionalized) channels. This serves 
as the basis for my measure of political participation, which contains commonly used 
                                                            
2 See above, as well as Ikeda, Kobayashi and Richey (2012) and Brady, Verba and Schlozman 
(1995). 
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binary measures (including those used by Bolzendahl & Coffe) as well as variables 
capturing some elements of online political engagement, a rising field. 
Regarding who participates, the literature shows us that there are some very 
consistent indicators. For example, though the specifics and strength of the effect varies 
widely with political and situational context, social class and socioeconomic status have 
consistently significantly influenced participation (Kourvetaris & Dobratz 1982).3 In 
particular, Knoke and others found in the late 1970s that  
“…the higher the SES the greater is the tendency to vote for the more 
conservative Party…. [T]hat education, occupation, and age are the main 
influences on social-problem liberalism. Income and race have the main effects on 
economic conservatism. Race, age and education are the main influences on racial 
policy preferences. Higher income leads to greater economic conservatism while 
higher education fosters liberalism in social issues.(Knoke 1979 and  Weiner & 
Eckland 1979 in: Kourvetaris & Dobratz 1982)”  
While Kourvetaris and Dobratz had found a number of articles suggesting a 
decline in class-based politics, a decade later a review by Manza, Hout, and Brooks 
concluded that there is no consensus in the field on the topic, and that there is no support 
for theories of a process of “class dealignment [with political engagement].”They go on 
to state more clearly that “At this juncture only one conclusion is firm: In no democratic 
capitalist country has vote been entirely independent of class in a national 
election.(Manza, Hout, & Brooks 1995)”  
Coffe and Bolzendahl’s 2010 study also indicates the importance of demographic 
characteristics for political participation. Their study of gender differences in American 
political behavior found that while women were more likely to “… sign petitions, 
boycott/buy products for political reasons, and donate to or raise money for social and 
                                                            
3 This citation references a review article. Examine Pages 304-306 for additional details on the 
number of studies that confirm this effect. 
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political groups” and (all else equal) would vote more than men if equally interested, men 
were more likely to be involved in political parties, collective activism, and political 
contact. This study also indicated that regardless of gender, time availability would be a 
key variable influencing involvement in a variety of political activities, a variable that 
may have more class-based implications than for other variables (Coffe & Bolzendahl 
2010). 
More sociological work has focused on contextual models of participation, 
looking at the social and political situations in which voters find themselves. For 
example, Rolfe notes that institutions can affect voter turnout simply through creating or 
removing barriers (literacy tests, ID laws, etc.) or by virtue of the electoral system 
employed (2012). Other influential factors involve the efforts by strategic politicians and 
political campaigns (who have an interest in increasing turnout if they believe they can 
win), while perhaps the most significant factor Rolfe argues for is a person’s social 
context, which includes the context and influence of their social network (2012).  
It is important to keep in mind, though, that political participation extends beyond 
voting, as citizens may clearly exercise the power to influence governments past 
threatening incumbents with an ousting. For example, though much prior research has 
focused on institutional forms of political participation such as working on a campaign, 
joining a party, and similar work (in addition to, of course, voting), prior work indicates 
that these types of engagement “…are declining or holding steady at lower levels”(Coffe 
& Bolzendahl 2010). Instead, in many Western states, participation in the form of 
activism is growing, demonstrating an increasing salience in alternative forms of political 
engagement (Coffe  & Bolzendahl 2010).  
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However, interest in politics has been shown to be insufficient for explaining 
political engagement, nor is socioeconomic status. Others have noted that focusing on 
access to resources not only allows researchers to account for SES, but to also gain a 
more nuanced view of disparities in activity among relevant groups. For example, it has 
been noted that while interest in politics is important for voter turnout, diverse civic skills 
are more relevant to those issues that require a time investment (Brady et al 1995). 
Somewhat unsurprisingly, access to money as a resource was most valuable in those 
efforts that required financial investment, a point that shines on the dramatic results of the 
increased role of money in politics in the last fifteen years (Brady et al 1995).  
This brings us to consider how people participate. Once people become active, 
interesting patterns emerge regarding the issues they voice and the methods selected to 
convey their concerns. As some were surprised to observe, “Activity aimed at influencing 
policy … is much less likely to convey a message about basic human needs. …Although 
it is purportedly the mode of participation available to those with few resources …issues 
of basic human need were mentioned infrequently in connection with protests. 
(Schlozman et al 1995)” Similarly, voters seemed to be the only group most motivated by 
economic growth, but most activists (in some form or another) were deeply concerned 
with issues such as education, taxes, and abortion (Schlozman et al 1995). Education is 
an interesting focus, as several studies found that education into pro-social attitudes has a 
highly significant effect on activities such as volunteering as an adult (Janoski et al 
1998). Given some of this diversity of thought in who is politically active and how, we 
can move into the interesting question of why.  
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When considering the reasons that people become politically active, a first finding 
is the obvious argument that a person may see some sort of social problem that they feel 
can be addressed via political channels. This suggestion can be rooted quite well in 
citizenship ideals, or perceptions of what it means to be a good citizen, and the related 
rights, responsibilities, and obligations that come with those perceptions. Macpherson 
notes the importance of these ideals, commenting that “Those beliefs... determine the 
limits and possible development of the system: they determine what people will put up 
with, and what they will demand.(Macpherson 1977)” Theiss-Morse argues for the 
existence of a variety of citizenship beliefs, but notes that all fundamentally affect 
whether and how citizens choose to participate in political action. For example, in 1993 
she found that: 
 “For example, the Representative Democracy perspective promotes the belief 
that good citizens must vote to make government officials responsive, but the 
Political Enthusiast perspective suggests that voting may be an ineffective way to 
be heard, and the Indifferent perspective does not see the need for voting since 
citizens have little influence over government decisions anyway.(Theiss-Morse)” 
This suggests that people’s different orientations toward what it means to be a good 
citizen and perceived responsiveness of the government to various political acts will both 
affect whether they engage, and how they elect to do so.  
Other studies argue the case that political information or online social networking 
can lead people to better engage with politics. Indeed, in political studies circles, it is 
fairly common knowledge that as people gain better political information, they become 
more active. While this effect is consistent, its strength is questionable. Levendusky 
found that a great majority of studies confirming this effect relied on cross-sectional data 
that may have exaggerated the strength of the effect of information on political behavior 
(2011). Using panel data, he found that while information does have a significant effect 
13 
 
on participation, it may not be a very strong effect, and efforts to increase participation 
should likely focus on other factors along with providing information. Thus, while we 
can likely hold on to the belief that information availability will help drive people to 
participate, we must continue to devote attention to other factors such as social status or 
citizenship ideals. 
Online social networking, meanwhile, is shown to encourage political 
participation via political exchanges. However, Gainous, Marlowe and Wagner find that 
this effect is still influenced strongly by social status. Their data indicated that low-status 
individuals were less likely to run into political exchanges in their online social networks 
than those with more resources (2013). Thus, while this medium does help drive people 
to engage, it also tends to maintain existing patterns of inequality. 
Finally, one reason behind political engagement can be found among those least 
likely to participate - low-status or low-income people. A 2001 study found that among 
the urban poor, those who had positive interactions with social workers but negative 
engagements with law enforcement may be more likely to participate in politics (Lawless 
& Fox). While this would not be a good policy model to replicate, it does indicate that 
some adverse conditions may foster political involvement (Lawless & Fox 2001).  
From this examination, I can arrive at a few conclusions. First, the concept of 
“political participation” can include a diverse array of political behaviors, which tend to 
range from formal, institutionalized acts (voting, campaigning, writing a representative) 
to more “activist” behaviors, such as boycotting, buycotting, and protesting. A diverse 
group of people tend to engage politically, but those with high socioeconomic status and 
access to resources tend to be most active, and most effective in reaching their goals. 
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However, the poor are not completely disengaged, and there are observable gender and 
racial differences among how participates, and how. With this in mind, I can move on to 
the next topics. Particularly, we can consider which other factors affect political 
participation: Political Alienation, Social Capital, and Peer Influence.  
Characteristics of Political Alienation 
Alienation is among the oldest concepts used in sociology, and its use predates the 
discipline by a generation. Because of this, alienation has been used heavily, its meaning 
and interpretations fogging and solidifying to the point that its use began to spark some 
critical arguments by the mid- 1970s and 1980s, after a few decades of disciplinary 
popularity. The history of the concept is far too extensive to cover here, but there are key 
points worth discussing that clarify my own use of the concept. 
In sociological circles, mentioning alienation most often calls the works of Karl 
Marx to mind, and he has played an instrumental role in bringing the concept to our 
discipline. Marx’s version of alienation is generally described by the sense of 
estrangement one feels from themselves and others as an objectified person whose labor 
has been commodified (and the products of their labor owned and managed by another) 
as a part of a capitalist system (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner 2006). However, some 
scholars skeptical of the concept have observed that Marx himself moved away from its 
use in his later works (Lee 1972). Because of heavy use in the mid-20th century, 
alienation has undergone some substantial transformation, with Seeman observing that 
alienation has come to include six ‘varieties’:  
1.Powerlessness: The sense of low control vs mastery over events;  
2.Meaninglessness: The sense of incomprehensibility vs understanding of 
personal and social affairs; 
15 
 
3.Normlessness: High expectancies for/commitment to socially unapproved 
means vs conventional means for the achievement of given goals; 
4.Cultural estrangement/value isolation: Individual's rejection of commonly 
held values in the society (or subsector) vs commitment to the going group 
standards;  
5.Self-estrangement: The individual's engagement in activities that are not 
intrinsically rewarding vs involvement in a task or activity for its own sake; 
and 
6.Social isolation: The sense of exclusion or rejection vs social acceptance. 
(Seeman 1975) 
 In particular, the first two items are of interest, because they have often been 
applied in this form to political questions. 
Taking the concepts of powerlessness and meaninglessness to develop a concept 
of political alienation is a viable attitudinal measure if we choose to regard alienation as a 
multifaceted concept. There is certainly precedent for this treatment, as Gamson argues 
for a strong distinction between meaninglessness and powerlessness (as elements of 
political alienation), and Seeman elaborates that “One hypothesis derived from this view 
holds that political mobilization should be greatest where the two alienations are not 
unitary but discrepant - where powerlessness is low, but distrust is high.(Gamson, 
Seeman in: Seeman 1975)” While the empirical results of such an argument are 
inconclusive, I find this distinction to be practical because it allows for multidimensional 
considerations of how alienation can affect dependent variables in different ways. 
Seeman concludes that regardless, this hypothesis “…suggests that at this juncture 
it may be more productive to think in terms of the disunities rather than the unity of 
alienation, the strong distinction between trust and efficacy4 being quite common and 
fruitful in the politically oriented literature.(Seeman 1975)” Zeller, Neal, and Groat also 
found time-series support for the multidimensionality of alienation concepts, noting that 
                                                            
4 Efficacy, in this case, referring to a person’s perceived ability to influence political events. More 
detail on this topic will appear in the discussion below. 
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controlling for events such as wars or inflation continues to support long-term accuracy 
and salience of sub-variables of alienation including powerlessness and meaninglessness 
(1980). As such, I intend to further explore this issue by including three facets of 
alienation in my study: powerlessness, meaninglessness (both of which can be understood 
in terms of efficacy), and mistrust.5  
We can understand these three concepts to match the following definitions for this 
study. Powerlessness is represented by the respondent’s perceived lack of ability to shape 
political events through their own efforts (Seeman 1966).6 Seeman clearly defines 
meaninglessness when he states “We may speak of high alienation, in the 
meaninglessness usage, when the individual is unclear as to what he ought to believe-
when the individual's minimal standards for clarity in decision-making are not 
met.(1959)” This can also be understood as a situation in which the respondent finds 
politics or political events incomprehensible, or too complicated for them to identify and 
act upon means of influencing political events.7 Finally, mistrust will be understood as a 
lack of trust in federal political officials or political institutions. 
Having defined and operationalized the concept of alienation, it is important to 
devote some space to the actual results of studies exploring the relationship between 
alienation and political behavior. Given the lack of consensus on whether alienation 
                                                            
5 An argument can possibly be made that the alienation concepts of powerlessness and 
meaninglessness have not fallen into disuse, but have actually been replaced by the terms internal 
and external self-efficacy, both of which are often measured using the same survey questions as 
for powerlessness and meaninglessness. 
6 Similar to external self-efficacy:”…is the belief that the authorities or regime are responsive to 
influence attempts.” Balch, George. "Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept 
"Sense of Political Efficacy."" Political Methodology 1.2 (1974): 1-43. JSTOR. Web. 05 Feb. 
2012. 
7 Similar to internal self-efficacy:”…is the individual's belief that means of influence are 
available to him.”  Balch, George. "Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept "Sense 
of Political Efficacy."" Political Methodology 1.2 (1974): 1-43. JSTOR. Web. 05 Feb. 2012. 
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should encourage or depress political participation, the angle taken by the literature is 
also somewhat varied. For example, Adams, Dow, and Merril focused on the possible 
negative effects of alienation. In their 2006 study on voter abstention, results indicated 
that alienation is useful when distinguished from indifference, and that abstention based 
on each concept increases or decreases based on changes in messaging and policy goals 
espoused during election campaigns (Adams, Dow & Merril).  
A 1960 study found an inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and 
political alienation. However, it indicated that this type of alienation may lead toward 
political acts that serve to “protest against the existing power structure in the 
community”, these acts may include institutionalized and uninstitutionalized forms of 
political behavior (Thompson & Horton 1960). It, too, supported the multidimensional 
treatment of alienation espoused by Zeller, Neal, and Groat, though unlike them, this 
measure included some forms of mistrust. Zeller and company found support for their 
multidimensional treatment via factor analysis, but their measures did not include 
trust/mistrust, raising some questions about its use in alienation (Zeller, Neal & Groat 
1980).  Interestingly, Denters and Geurt found that the “meaninglessness” form of 
alienation generally depressed voter turnout, but the effects of powerlessness varied by 
each measure. Generally the effects were negative, but the effects were not always direct.  
Interestingly, while early studies of alienation actually found little significant 
connection between alienation and political apathy, others have found that alienated 
voters will be found at the ends of a (hypothetically normally distributed) spectrum, 
where their preferences may be far from candidates in an election (and are differentiated 
from indifferent voters, who would lay between the platforms of the candidates) (Dean 
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1960; Anderson & Glomm 1992). An alternative interpretation of alienation is developed 
from the basis of Meade’s ‘I, Me, and Generalized Other’, though some have argued that 
in enacting the ‘I’, a person’s various personal facets may include resilience and 
adaptability which, when one hinders the other, produces feelings of alienation. What 
follows, instead, is that “…the individual’s feelings of alienation tend to provide the 
clearest indications that the individual is not living as her performatively constructed and 
therefore particularized and shifting ‘nature’ (her ‘I’s) ‘dictate[s]’(Tyler 2011).”8  
In a more recent discussion of alienation, Southwell argues that commonly used  
measures of trust and internal/external efficacy9 are better explored as three separate 
dimensions in her concept of political alienation, defined as “…a set of attitudes or 
opinions that reflect a negative view of the political system. … [It] represents a less-than-
positive view of the political world; it indicates displeasure with political leaders and 
institutions”(2012). She also aptly quotes Franz Neuman’s well-put definition that claims 
alienation to be a “conscious rejection of the whole political system which expresses 
itself in apathy”(Neuman in: Southwell 2012). This demonstrates that while deeply 
important, this concept is not always unified or clear, and must be used with caution 
when extrapolating results to broader populations or themes.  
However, if we were to follow Dean, Seeman and Southwell’s perception of 
alienation, then we can further divide our analysis to include Meaninglessness, 
Trust/Mistrust, and Powerlessness. Since the 1960s, researchers have observed a broad 
                                                            
8 Tyler goes on to clarify, “the agent’s feelings of alienation arise from her sense of distance from 
her own projected and inchoate ideal of herself as a person, with this ‘person’ being internally 
differentiated as a complex series of (congruent even if not actually mutually supporting) ‘I’s, 
each of which brings definition and order to some part of the otherwise ill-defined and fluid 
substratum of meanings and values that make up the individual’s ‘self’.” 
9 Subsequent content will clarify the relationship between internal/external self-efficacy, and the 
concepts of powerlessness and meaninglessness. 
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decline in trust in politics. This mistrust has been argued to range from distrust of 
individual politicians, to governmental and political institutions and the world of politics 
in general. It has been previously observed that political efficacy (one’s belief in their 
ability to make a difference) or powerlessness is strongly connected to political trust 
(Cole 1973; Csajko & Lindaman 2011; Southwell 2012). Yet contrary to this image, a 
fairly large portion of Americans believe that they are able to influence political affairs, 
compared to large populations in other countries, raising the question of why Americans 
aren’t a more trusting populace than current statistics demonstrate (Abravanel & Busch 
1975; Austin 2008; Southwell 2012). 
There has been some debate on the real effects of trust (or lack thereof) on 
political activity. Rosenstone and Hanson (1993) find no connection between likelihood 
of voting and political interest among more or less trusting people, a conclusion 
introduced by Miller in 1974. However, Hetherington (2005) suggests that trust or 
mistrust may have a great effect when it comes to policies that may involve risk or 
personal sacrifice on the part of the voter, such as redistributive policies (welfare, Social 
Security, etc.). This view is also supported by the finding that politically distrustful 
individuals are more involved in policy-related politics than highly trusting people 
(Shingles 2001). Yet there is some work questioning what some reported low levels of 
trust actually mean. Cook and Gronke ask whether today’s low level of trust reveals a 
profound disaffection, or instead amore superficial dissatisfaction with current politics, 
suggesting that “low trust in government and low confidence in institutions reflects 
skepticism, an unwillingness to presume that political authorities should be given the 
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benefit of the doubt. (2005)” They reinforce this point by citing Citrin’s concerns about 
popular measures (often used by the National Election Studies data sets), where he notes, 
“…the cynical responses to the CPS political trust items are hardly extreme. To 
believe that the government wastes “a lot” of money, can be trusted to “do what is 
right only some of the time,” and includes “quite a few” people who are 
“crooked” or “don’t know what they’re doing” need not bespeak a deep-seated 
hostility toward the political system. (Citrin in: Cook & Gronke 2005)” 
Such may be true, but it can also be argued that less-extreme positions of mistrust 
may still bear meaningful implications for political involvement. For those concerned 
about the preservation of democratic institutions, apathy (or broad disengagement) could 
be as dangerous in the long run as those who are hostile (and active) toward the current 
system. As it stands, these authors are highly critical of NES10 measures, and raise some 
points worth bearing in mind when generalizing from NES or similar survey data.  
One clear message I found in this literature was that the empirical treatment of 
Alienation has never quite reached a state of consensus, though common themes tend to 
emerge. Powerlessness and meaninglessness appear to be common parent variables for 
the larger, latent concept. Concepts such as mistrust and normlessness, while not very 
commonly used measures, also make an occasional appearance, but need more empirical 
validation. But while the direction of the effect tends to also be contested, the Alienation 
literature does broadly agree that it does tend to significantly influence political 
participation, and I can thus continue to include it in this study. Having arrived at this 
conclusion, we can proceed to the second major concept under analysis: Social Capital. 
                                                            
10 National Election Studies 
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Social Capital - Origins and Its Present Day 
In order to assess the explanatory capabilities of political alienation, it would be 
best to compare it to another commonly used explanatory tool for political participation. 
Social capital immediately comes to mind, as it is a fairly well-vetted concept found to 
influence a wide variety of outcomes over the life course. It has been observed that life in 
communities rich in social capital tends to be easier, particularly in the context of civic 
engagement (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 1995).Putnam notes that “In the first place, 
networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and 
encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate coordination and 
communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be 
resolved.(“Bowling Alone” 1995)” However, in order to understand how this concept 
will be operationalized, it is important to establish social capital within its academic 
context.  
The concept of sociological social capital can be said to have three founders, each 
with their own specifications for the use of the concept. Though he had been building up 
to its introduction for several years, James Coleman produced an article 1988 in which he 
defined his version of the concept, noting that as: 
“…physical capital is wholly tangible, being embodied in observable material 
form, and human capital is less tangible, being embodied in the skills and 
knowledge acquired by an individual, social capital is less tangible yet, for it 
exists in the relations among persons. …For example, a group within which there 
is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more 
than a comparable group without that trustworthiness and trust. The value of the 
concept of social capital lies first in the fact that it identifies certain aspects of 
social structure by their functions…The function identified by the concept of 
"social capital" is the value of these aspects of social structure to actors as 
resources that they can use to achieve their interests.(Coleman 1988)” 
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In this case, Coleman was operating within the Rational Choice theoretical tradition, and 
so the concepts he examined focused on rational use of resources in social situations to 
achieve desired outcomes. As such, he considered social capital to be among those 
resources, differentiated from physical tools (physical capital) or acquired skills (human 
capital)(1988). More specifically, he identified social capital as those means social 
interactional resources that allow people to achieve their goals. He uses trust between 
people as an example of social capital, where in this case, the capital is trust, which can 
be used, “saved up”, or depleted by misuse. Yet proper use of trust in social relations can 
lead to a desired result, such as a promotion or being given more prestigious 
responsibilities in the work place. So in this case, social capital is a resource that operates 
on the social relational level, in the relationships and interactions that occur between 
individuals.  
Perhaps better known for his work to advance social capital is Robert Putnam, a 
Harvard political scientist who adopted Coleman’s concept and carried it to a wider 
market, devoting much of his career to the application of the theory. Putnam maintains 
Coleman’s definition, but puts it into more accessible language, translating it for an 
audience that may not have spent as much time embroiled in social theory. He adds 
clarity to Coleman’s initial explanation by commenting that social capital is those 
“features of social life-networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act together 
more effectively to pursue shared objectives. … Social capital, in short, refers to social 
connections and the attendant norms and trust.(Putnam 1995)” In this context, it is still 
clear that Social Capital continued its compatibility with microsociological topics, though 
Putnam also applied this concept at the community level and Coleman noted that this idea 
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could be applied to organizations, institutions, and corporations (though his empirical 
work did not reach this stage)(Coleman 1988).   
Pierre Bourdieu also developed a notion of social capital, one which was focused 
much more closely on power dynamics and economy (Siisiäinen 2000). Adopting far 
more technical language, Bourdieu focuses on the vital connection to social networks that 
a person must possess in order to build a valuable bank of social capital. While Putnam 
and Coleman do not require that social capital correlate with possession of other types of 
capital, Bourdieu argues that to some extent, the three must be connected. Noting that a 
person’s social capital is dependent on social networks in relation to group membership 
and social relationships (institutional or not), Bourdieu adds that 
 “…Although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital 
possessed by a given agent, …social capital is never completely independent of 
[these factors] because the exchanges instituting mutual acknowledgment 
presuppose the re-acknowledgment of a minimum of [common 
objectives].(Bourdieu in Biggart 2002) ” 
 As such, he argues that social capital cannot be fully separated from other types of 
capital because of the nature of mutual social agreements that occur with the use and 
acquisition of social capital. Given the commonalities between these interpretations, it is 
interesting to note that the empirical context in which this concept is used substantially 
affects the perception of its meaning.   
One interesting series of studies on social capital and political behavior serves to 
illustrate the relationship more clearly. Nielson and Paxton (2010) sought to assess how 
social capital affects political consumerism, specifically boycotting or boycotting items 
based on political or ethical criteria (two measures used in my own index of political 
participation). They found that each of their measures of social capital had significant 
effects on political consumerism: in their conclusion, Nielson and Paxton noted that 
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“…At the individual level, generalized trust, trust in institutions, association involvement, 
and frequency of social meetings all have significant effects on political consumerism: 
positive in the case of generalized trust, association memberships and social meetings, 
and negative for trust in institutions.(2010)”  
Associational involvement is frequently a key variable in the measurement of 
Social Capital, and is featured prominently in a number of studies. Quintelier found that 
youth involvement in voluntary associations broadly encouraged political participation in 
adulthood (2008). Contrary to Janoski’s findings (1998), however, Quintelier found that 
the specific type of voluntary association made a difference (as opposed to volunteering 
in general), commenting that “Cultural, deliberative and help organizations are more 
successful than expressive, religious-ethnic and youth groups in socializing young people 
into politics. …this might be explained by the organizations' aims: organizations of the 
first type aim to aid society, ...while expressive organizations are more entertainment-
oriented.(2008)” These results replicated in part earlier findings by McFarland and 
Thomas who similarly found that selective participation in extracurricular organizations 
(that were “politically salient”)  encouraged long-term political activity a decade later 
(2006). 
Peer Influence- How it May Develop, Selected Findings 
Given its importance to the concept of social capital, and to this study, it is worth 
emphasizing here the role of peer influence to my argument. Though Alienation is the 
primary independent variable, the effect of this factor will likely be heavily moderated by 
social relations with others. It is well known that the people we are around have an 
influence on our behavior – as social beings, we do not operate within a vacuum. There is 
25 
 
no reason this shouldn’t be the case with political behavior. 
In fact, Anthony Orum argued that Americans are coming to identify less with 
political parties and organizations, but are instead connecting to political participation 
through a political arena, in which “…Social proximity to the center of the political 
arena, where the battles of politics are fought and where power is exercised, then, is what 
we might call the cornerstone of this conception.(1979)” Yet another common connection 
between peer influence and political behavior can be found in the studies of religion and 
politics. Aside from the obvious role of churches in civil rights movements (and others), 
but some have noted “…both the role of churches and religion in training members in the 
art of citizenry and providing them with the orientation to politics and instigation 
necessary to take their civic resources into the political sphere.(Djupe & Grant 2001)” 
Given that the study cited limited their sample to regular churchgoers, the likelihood of 
peer influence is clear. Others have found highly significant support for the effect of peer 
influence on political participation, discussion of politics with parents and friends had 
positive effects on political participation, political consumerism, and civic participation 
(Quintelier 2008).  
This effect, often criticized for the number of studies that rely on simple 
correlation as evidence, has been confirmed in panel studies by Casey A. Klofstad and 
others (2010). In fact, Klofstad’s findings are interesting because of how they relate 
directly to my own measures of peer influence. Klofstad’s 2010 article focused on the 
relationship between peer networks, civic talk (“talking about politics and current events 
with our peers”), and civic participation. His results indicated that participants were more 
likely to participate in civic organizations years after engaging in political talk, and 
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“…Further analysis shows that the initial boost in civic participation caused by civic talk 
is the mechanism by which the effect of civic talk lasts into the future.(Klofstad 2010)” 
This supports the importance of including variables measuring political discussion in a 
study such as mine, even in such a basic capacity.  
An important caveat, however, was observed by researchers a few years 
previously, where some found that exposure to disagreement in discussion yields reduced 
odds of political participation (Pattie & Johnston 2008). Yet Pattie and Johnston found 
that such is not necessarily the case. Their study found that in some circumstances, “…for 
some forms of activism, exposure to countervailing views may actually motivate 
participation.(2008)” Lim supports this argument, commenting that their work on 
network ties and political participation indicates that the contexts in which social ties are 
formed influence the type and level of political, civic, and community activism engaged 
in by citizens (Lim 2008). 
 Though she limits her work to issues affecting voter turnout, Meredith Rolfe 
focuses quite closely on the role of context in social networks and voting behavior, noting 
that certain types or configurations of social networks can encourage or discourage 
participation (Rolfe 2012). Arguably, this theory could easily be expanded to include 
other types of political behavior. She describes this effect as resulting in a state of 
conditional choice between others’ actions and the respondent (Rolfe 2012). In this case, 
the respondent makes a choice to engage or disengage (to vote or not to vote) 
conditionally, with consideration for the behaviors or perceived social response from the 
person’s network, thus providing an argument that examining such network variables and 
controlling for social location can explain variances in voting behavior (Rolfe 2012).  
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The conceptually related role of opinion leaders is also one to consider in political 
behavior. Research on the idea and role of opinion leaders (and the related two-step flow 
concept) appeared to be taking off in the 1950s, with the findings that information from 
the media frequently isn’t absorbed directly by consumers, but is often filtered and 
relayed by opinion leaders, people who are considered influential within their social 
groups. Opinion leaders are found to exist in nearly every type of social group (regardless 
of class) and often fit the same demographics as their peers, but are simply more in-tune 
with the outside world and share that knowledge with interested associates (Katz 1957). 
Based on this concept, the argument goes that opinion leaders share their views 
(respected by those they influence) with others in their network, where those view affect 
people’s own political decisions, opinions, or behavior. Such may even affect what issues 
they feel are salient, valuable, or worth addressing.  
This is worth mentioning here because it outlines another element demonstrating 
the importance of considering peer influences. Though my study cannot assess who the 
respondent’s opinion leaders are (or if they have any), it indicates why variables 
capturing the possibility of peer influence are highly salient to my study’s goals while 
supporting a theoretical precedent for the consideration of peer influence. In particular, it 
is important because the effects of factors like social capital or alienation may be 
moderated (and directly affected) by the attitudes, support, or mutual engagement (or 
apathy) of friends. Thus, though it is not a direct component of my key variables, the 
concept of peer influence is an important element of my study.  
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IV. Theoretical Background 
Political participation is a fairly popular topic, and theories seeking to explain the 
variation in participation are widely available. Fewer recent studies focus on alienation as 
a major independent variable. Broadly speaking, it appears that theories seeking to clarify 
political participation can be categorized into descriptive groups. Specifically, 
explanations seem to include (from macro- to micro-level): the state-centric, 
institutionalist, demographic, network, and personal/psychological. Theories on the 
broader, aggregate level bear some interesting explanatory potential, especially in 
exploring the effects of state model or institutional forms on individual perceptions and 
political behavior. Given the analytical bounds of this study, such is not the focus here, 
except to acknowledge that such things do likely have an effect. However, other 
theoretical categories lend themselves better to analysis via CID data, and it is upon those 
that we will focus.  
In particular, the two segments below focus on various interpretations of Social 
Capital theory to explain political behavior. I discuss these works so that they may 
exemplify how Social Capital may be counted in my model as a concept whose effects 
can be compared to those of political alienation. Social capital theory can be regarded as 
having two key sources in the works of Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Putnam, and James 
Coleman. While the concept is actually one of three dimensions of capital, Bourdieu’s 
interpretation focuses on social capital as a symbolic resource that emphasizes conflict 
and power. In this case, social capital is useful in struggles for other resources or social 
positions (Siisiainen 2000). Putnam and Coleman’s usage can be more clearly simplified 
in the form of three primary components: “moral obligations and norms, social values 
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(especially trust) and social networks (especially voluntary associations).(Siisiainen 
2000)” With these understandings in mind, we can move to examine the points below. 
Theory of Social Capital through Interaction  
Building on Putnam’s work in Social Capital theory, Ikeda, Kobayashi and 
Richey sought to put Social Capital to their own test, to empirically confirm its more 
interactionist elements (2012). The core of their claim is that Social Capital theory can be 
used to predict political participation, but that this must include informal social 
interaction. Though the authors do not identify any competing theories, they argue that 
through their model they have proven the power of Social Capital theory, and that it 
remains appropriate to explain political participation. Though rather simplistic, their 
theoretical model conceptualizes social networking as leading directly to political 
participation. The authors argue that this occurs through three pathways of interactions: 
those with Nonpolitical Social Associations, Overtly Political Organizational 
Associations, and through Informal Interactions (such as soccer clubs or bowling 
leagues).  
These three factors have a positive correlation with engaging in a variety of 
political behaviors, from voting and campaigning to letter-writing and protesting. In 
essence, they argue for a rather Interactionist approach to studying the role of social 
capital in influencing behavior, asserting that the most informal acts can lead to higher 
political participation. Taking this step further from simple, small acts, they claim that 
diverse forms of social integration can combine to dramatically increase political 
participation. Through their analysis, they find that informal recreation, and social and 
political associations all have a positive, significant effect. 
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However, their results leave me unconvinced that Ikeda and company have found 
a one-shot solution to explaining political participation. They find good support for the 
value of Social Capital theory, but their failure to consider (or even mention) any 
conflicting theories makes me wonder where the critical value of this project lies. 
Further, this method of theoretical support implies that the Interactional variables must 
explain political behaviors to the exclusion of all others, yet their own regression results 
indicate other meaningful factors beyond common demographics (in their model, 
political/civil rights and political connections yielded significant results). 
Despite these issues, the Interactionist Theory of Social Capital (a title I assign it; 
they give it no name) is worth discussing because it seems to support a well-known 
theory and some of its concepts are useful to my own proposed study. Specifically, 
though I would discourage attempting to explain a broad set of behaviors with a single 
category of variables, I find Ikeda and company’s measures of social interaction and 
networking valuable. Social influences are a vital component of my study, not only 
because of their direct effects (as these authors suggest) but because of how they can 
moderate the effects of other variables, including my measures of Alienation. As such, 
some of these types of measures will be useful in constructing my own model. 
Resource Mobilization in Civil Society Model 
In a second vein of the Social Capital literature, I have examined one of the many 
collaborations of Brady, Verba and Schlozman, who worked to develop a more specific 
concept of the role of resources in politics. Instead of settling for the explanatory power 
of Socioeconomic Status, they argue for a Resource model, in which they claim that 
access to resources beyond those measured by SES are a vital predictor of engagement in 
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political activity. 
In particular, they develop this model because the authors feel that psychological 
explanations and those based on SES or rational-choice models are insufficient to capture 
the full scope of political activity. Instead, they contend that a model resembling the 
Resource Mobilization concept (potentially borrowed from social movements literature) 
may be more effective, as it allows them to distinguish between those who abstain from 
political behavior by choice and those who do so because of a lack of those resources 
needed in order to be politically active (Brady et al. 1995). This allows the authors to 
create more reliable, material measures of constraints on political activity, instead of 
depending solely on motivational concepts. Their concerns about simple SES models are 
actually based more on such models’ lack of a causal mechanism linking status to 
behavior, (they acknowledge its respectable predictive power)(Brady et al 1995). Thus, 
Brady and company argue that a hybrid theory of SES and Resource Mobilization will be 
better able to predict and explain political behavior. Substantively, this results in a 
theoretical argument that possibly bears a more striking resemblance to Social Capital 
theory than the authors may have intended.  
Brady and associates spend time assessing the role of learning civic skills in 
political activity, focusing on those gained from extrapolitical institutional settings 
(somewhat mirroring Ikeda, Kobayashi, and Richey’s concept of Nonpolitical Social 
Associational skills). They then move to the heart of their argument, in which they seek 
to show that access to resources explains political participation and that different 
resources will influence the political activities engaged respondents choose. This trio has 
constructed a fairly useful figure depicting their model (Brady et al., p 277). However, 
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their model can be condensed, in terms of institutional involvement causing pre-political 
skills, which then in turn causes political participation. Socio-economic status uses these 
mechanisms to create political involvement, so this model clarifies what SES does (Brady 
et al. 1995). These sets of skills or attributes are meant to coalesce into the resources of 
Time, Civic Skills, or Money, which combine well to match the concept of social capital. 
These are then argued to translate directly to a range of political acts, which are shown to 
be marginally influenced by political interest and citizenship. 
Generally speaking, the theory is well constructed and seems to be fairly 
comprehensive. However, I find myself looking for the role of networks or peer 
influences in this study, and only find implied relationships. The authors’ consideration 
of the relationship between job opportunities, organizational opportunities, church 
opportunities, and the possession of relevant skills at least implies the social mechanism 
of voluntary involvement and religious affiliations serving as learning grounds for 
political behavior. Yet this connection is left largely to the reader’s assumptions, and its 
lack of specificity makes institutions appear to be magic black boxes that skills come out 
of. Indeed, the key weakness of this theory is that, despite the innately social nature of its 
subject, the role of people is curiously absent, often implied but seldom explored beyond 
their ability to be the subjects of social forces, rather than active participants in social 
processes. Though I also think this theoretical model would do well to try to consider 
subjective or affective states in influencing political behavior, the authors make a fair 
point about the difficulties in reliably measuring such attitudinal concepts. This theory is, 
however, useful to me because of its focus on the value of institutional involvements, and 
how they (as an element of social capital theory) can dispose one toward political 
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participation. Their operationalization of this concept is fairly clear, and its connection to 
participation reinforces the need to include associational involvement in my own models. 
However, it also suffers from the tendency to produce one theoretical framework as the 
solution to a complex array of political behavioral patterns, an issue I intend to address in 
my own work.   
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Theory of Participatory Alienation 
This brings us to the key concepts, political alienation and political behavior. The 
two social capital-based theories discussed have been considered because they are 
recognized to have a significant effect upon political activity, but fail to provide complete 
explanations, lacking the additional explanatory abilities of political alienation. In 
particular, political alienation can affect political behavior in ways that vary beyond the 
simplistic measures of voting or donating for an election or cause. Instead, given the 
mixed literature on the effect of alienation, I am given to ask whether (and how) political 
alienation significantly affects political participation, and if the effect is universally 
negative. Given that many studies focus on alienation primarily, without many options 
for comparison, I wish to see if any observed effects will hold up under comparison to the 
effects of social capital. 
This brings us to my theoretical argument. As can be seen in Figure 2, my 
expectations in this area are fairly simple. In reference to the theories I selected for 
comparison, it is safe to assume that social capital (with its connections to cultural, social, 
and economic resources) has a direct effect on political behavior (Items 1 and 4). This 
makes intuitive and theoretical sense, as the large amount of social integration that tends 
to come with social capital can combine well with financial and educational resources to 
make comprehension of and engagement in politics easier. The benefits of participation 
may be more salient to engaged citizens. My consideration of resources such as social 
capital or socioeconomic status also carries the merit in that it can allow me to examine 
the effect of alienation beyond the limitations of one’s resources. 
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Figure 2: Theoretical Representation of Alienation Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This brings me to Item 2 in our figure, the core concept of Political alienation 
(and the key to my research question). I expect that alienation in the form of 
meaninglessness and powerlessness will negatively affect political participation, but can 
be softened by controlling for social capital. A person with high social capital, who may 
already be inclined toward participation may be more likely to gain the skills or social 
connections to overcome feelings of powerlessness, but may engage in fewer forms of 
participation. However, I suspect that mistrust may have a positive effect on 
participation, as the respondent may feel that change in the political system is necessary. 
Peer influence (Item 3) will, I suspect, moderate the effect of each form of alienation on 
participation, where those who maintain active social relationships with friends will be 
more likely to engage in political activities. I expect that when it comes to alienated 
citizens, active relationships with friends or peers can make the difference between an 
apathetic response and the decision to become involved in some sort of group political 
activity. To this effect, I present the following three hypotheses: 
  
3-Peer Influence 
2-Political Alienation 
4-Recent Political Behavior  
1-Social Capital 
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Hypotheses 
 Alienation Hypotheses: 
H1: If the respondent experiences high powerlessness or meaninglessness, they 
will engage in fewer political activities. 
H2: If the respondent is mistrustful of political institutions, they will engage in a 
greater number of political activities. 
Here we see the core of my expectations, and the fundamental concepts I will test. 
I expect that feelings of alienation from the government or party in power will affect the 
way individuals interact with the political system. These can occur in the form of feelings 
of powerlessness, or inability to find meaning in political narratives. In general, 
alienation will reduce odds of participating in political activities because the respondent 
may perceive the official system as something corrupt or insensitive to the needs of 
everyday citizens. At this point, some may tend toward apathy (especially if they lack the 
resources for any engagement or lack the political socialization needed to be able to make 
sense of political information) or reduced engagement.  
Regarding hypothesis 2, we find a potential contradiction in that mistrust is 
expected to lead to increased engagement, as the respondent may be inclined to change a 
system they do not trust.  
Social Capital Hypothesis: 
H3:  If a respondent has high social capital, then they will engage in more political 
activities. 
The logic behind this prediction is that a person with high social capital will be 
more likely to be plugged into local issues and leaders, and will thus have the resources, 
knowledge, and social connections that may make participation possible. Since they 
would have greater social connections to their community, they may perceive a higher 
stake in its wellbeing. I expect this outcome because my measures of social capital focus 
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on membership in a variety of community and civic organizations. The potential long-
term nature of these connections also represents opportunities to develop the types of 
capital that allow for political participation and the investment in community that 
increases the respondent’s stake in political events (providing the inclination to engage). 
Further, given the respondent’s hypothetical connections and education, they may also 
experience higher self-efficacy and ability to understand the dynamics that drive politics, 
allowing them confidence in their ability to comprehend and participate in political 
activities. 
Peer Influence Hypotheses: 
H4: If a respondent frequently communicates with close friends, then they will 
engage in more political activities. 
H5: If a respondent frequently visits close friends, then they will engage in more 
political activities. 
H6: If a respondent frequently discusses politics with close friends, then they will 
engage in more political activities. 
These expectations are based on the empirical findings in the literature of the 
importance of peer networks in encouraging political participation. The logic guiding the 
first two hypotheses is very similar. In line with Ikeda, Kobayashi, and Richey’s theory, 
any sort of social activity should be positively related with political behavior. More 
specifically, according to their argument, as respondents spend more time with or talking 
to friends, they should engage in a higher number of political acts than those who do not.  
Similarly, several studies have found that discussing politics with others has a positive 
effect for increasing people’s interest and participation in a number of political acts 
(Quintelier 2008; Klofstad 2010; Lazarsfeld 1939). Thus, my related hypothesis expects 
to replicate this result.  
  
38 
 
V. Methods and Analysis 
The goal of this analysis is to explain to what extent (if at all) political alienation 
affects one’s amount of political participation, and whether this effect is moderated by 
peer influence. The variables selected for the analysis are based largely on previous 
research in this topic and for comparison to popular means of explaining political 
behavior. More specifically, this analysis will compare the explanatory power of 
alienation to that of social capital, a concept that, while not limited to explaining political 
behavior, has been extensively used for the purpose. Properly completed, this analysis 
will provide us with a better understanding methodological merit of assessing alienation 
as a significant variable in predicting political behaviors, and whether social interaction 
of any sort can significantly outweigh the effects of political alienation (if they are 
found). Given the contested and largely diminished study of alienation (in its general 
form, and as applied to politics) in current research, this analysis may help to lend clarity 
to the current state of the concept, and illustrate how it may be used more meaningfully in 
future research. 
Data Set & Sample 
The data I will be using for this analysis comes from the 2006 United States 
Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy (CID) survey. This data set was compiled in 
summer 2005 (released in 2006) at the request of Georgetown University’s Center for 
Democracy and Civil Society, and led by Drs. Marc M. Howard, James L. Gibson, and 
Dietland Stolle (USCID 2008). The purpose of this data set’s development was twofold: 
to permit an in-depth study of a variety of themes related to US civic engagement, and to 
allow for comparative studies with 22 countries included in the European Social Survey. 
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The former purpose is more relevant to this study. In particular, this set is more useful 
than the commonly-used American National Election Studies (ANES) data because the 
CID survey provides a greater variety of variables relating to political and civic 
engagement, and networks or peer influence. These variables also provide greater 
specificity than those currently available in many of the ANES sets. 
Featuring 1,001 cases, the survey was heavily based on the European Social 
Survey, with the intention of providing a data set for the US that could be used 
comparatively with data on European countries (USCID 2008). It gathered political 
involvement data at a household level using stratified cluster sampling, with weights to 
improve its national generalizability. In some ways, this data set is a significant 
improvement over the ANES data because it contains the greater variety of network and 
social interactional variables that are vital to exploring the role of alienation in political 
participation. However, the nature of the CID sampling and its 41.47% response rate 
places it at an above-average quality level, though it is below the rate required for the 
highest-quality academic surveys, such as the General Social Survey (USCID: 
Methodology 2008). 
Analysis 
Missing data somewhat impeded this analysis, as (despite the 1001 sample size) 
some constructed variables had too few observations to allow for a stable model (See the 
following section for specific variable measures). Such variables had to be omitted from 
analysis, including types of voluntary associations the respondent had friends in. After 
removing potential outliers (identified via Cooks D), the resulting sample size of 721 was 
sufficient to continue with analysis. 
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All four regression models were performed using the Negative Binomial method. 
This choice was initially made because the dependent variable was a count measure, and 
its strong leftward skew was most compatible with this type of analysis. Tests indicated 
that the dependent variable (political participation) was not zero-inflated, but the presence 
of overdispersion revealed that a negative binomial model would be more accurate than 
Poisson for my purposes (Long & Freese 2006). Results will be analyzed by converting 
coefficients into incidence rate ratios for interpretation. Each model is nested within the 
previous model, as each new model builds upon the original model for comparison of 
model quality. I decided to use nested models for a few reasons, the first being that given 
the type of regression used (Negative Binomial) does not permit comparisons of model 
quality via methods such as F-Tests or comparing R2 scores. However, using the AIC’ 
and BIC’ indicators in nested models allows me to compare how model quality improves 
when alienation and peer influence variables are included (as opposed to relying solely 
on social capital). Finding positive changes in model quality and significant effects could 
then lend empirical support for the theory of Participatory Alienation. Thus, though the 
nature of negative binomial regression does not allow for quality testing using indicators 
such as the R-squared, AIC and BIC tests proved sufficient for model comparison. 
The analysis includes a fourth model to check for moderation between alienation 
and peer influence variables. For regression diagnostics of all models, Cook’s D, AIC, 
and BIC tests were used and considered together to eliminate influential cases, and 
compare and evaluate model fit. Comparisons between models using AIC and BIC tests 
all revealed strong support for each successive model, with the greatest improvement 
being between models 1 and 2.  
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Measures 
For this study, the dependent variable is an indexed measure of political 
participation. The variable (titled POLACT) is a simple index, which is the sum of 13 
types of binary political participation variables. As such, the dependent variable is a 13-
point measure, where one point is assigned to each type of activity the respondent had 
participated in within the last twelve months. Though the data set contains a wide variety 
of behavioral variables, other elements of civic engagement were omitted from analysis 
because they were not specifically political, though they may be relevant to other 
methods of social change-making, including community service or development. Table 
5.1 indicates the variables included, and the percentage of respondents who had engaged 
in each activity. This measure is based on a variety of common measures of participation 
discussed in the literature section. As discussed in the literature review, my measures 
largely align with those used by Bolzendahl and Coffe (2010), with the inclusion of 
Table 5.1: Frequencies of Variables Composing “Political Activity”
Variables - In last 12 Months, Respondent has: N % Participated 
Voted in Presidential Election 985 71.74 
Signed petition for a cause 1000 34.30 
Bought product specifically for political/ethical reasons 995 23.41 
Worn political button/badge  999 22.40 
Contacted a politician 1000 20.90 
Donated money to political organization or group 999 20.30 
Boycotted goods/services for political/ethical reasons 995 18.41 
Forwarded electronic message with political content 985 13.80 
Worked for a political campaign 998 8.21 
Worked for political action group or party 1001 7.99 
Participated in political activity online 985 7.71 
Participated in legal public demonstration 997 4.81 
Participated in illegal form of protest 994 1.30 
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variables oriented more toward activism as supported by Walder (2009), Fisher (2012), 
and others. As could be expected, the most frequently occurring act was voting.  
This survey oversampled voters (in 2004, the voter participation rate was 63.8% 
of eligible citizens 18 years of age or older), but the other activities cannot be confirmed 
(US Census 2006). Between 20-35% of respondents had signed petitions, worn buttons, 
contacted politicians, donated money, or bought products for political or ethical reasons. 
Beyond these activities, participation declined sharply.  
When indexed (see Figure 3), the measure of political activity is skewed heavily 
to the left, indicating that a majority of respondents had engaged in fewer than five types 
of political acts in the past year. Considering again that the past twelve months included a 
Presidential election and the preceding months (often containing a flurry of pre-election 
political activity for those who are inclined to do so), this should be a fairly accurate 
estimate of the patterns of political behavior that respondents tend to follow during 
election years. However, it is important to keep in mind that presidential election years 
are known for featuring higher voter participation rates than in other years, and such may 
Figure 3: Distribution of Number of Political Acts by Respondent in Past 12 Months. (N=956)
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also be the case for other types of political activity such as campaigning or donating 
money. 
Independent Variables 
In order to analyze this variable Political Participation, I composed four nested 
models using negative binomial regression. The first regression was computed to predict 
political participation using measures of Social Capital. Social capital measures included 
religious service attendance, voluntary association membership (measured by number of 
types of organizations the respondent has joined), whether or not the respondent was a 
member of a neighborhood association, and whether they had ever been unemployed11 
for three months or longer. Descriptive statistics for each can be seen in Table 5.2. Zero-
Order correlations can be found in Appendix 1. These measures are based upon the many 
                                                            
11 Unemployment in this sense refers to the definition used by the US Census Bureau, 
emphasizing the requirement that the respondent had been seeking work during their time of 
unemployment.  
Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics of Social Capital (Independent) Variables 
Variable Proportion Mean Range SD 
Religious Attendance     
R attends church daily* 0.005 - - - 
R attends church once weekly or more 0.342 - - - 
R attends church once monthly or less 0.506 - - - 
R Never attends church 0.146 - - - 
R has ever been unemployed & seeking work for 3 
mo.+ 
0.354 - - - 
Voluntary Association Membership (# of types of 
orgs.) 
- 0.5025 0-5 0.8101 
Neighborhood/Homeowners/Condo. association or 
block club Member 
0.079 - - - 
R's placement on Liberal-Conservative scale 
(0=Liberal) 
- 5.4894 0-10 2.2655 
*Omitted reference category for Religious dummy variables. 
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studies of social capital that emphasize participatory association membership. In 
particular, I seek to compose a set similar to that used by Nielson and Paxton (2010), 
Quintelier (2008) and others. Despite Quintelier’s misgivings, I also include a measure of 
religious attendance, given the inclusion of religion both as a control commonly used in 
studies and as a type of voluntary association considered by others (McFarland & 
Thomas 2006; Janoski, Musick, & Wilson 1998; Wilson & Janoski 1005) 
The majority of respondents seldom or never attend religious services.  In the 
regression analysis, the reference group consists of respondents who never attend church 
or religious services. About a third of respondents had experienced unemployment for 
three months or longer, and the majority of respondents are center-left to center-right on 
the political ideology spectrum, though the sample skews very slightly toward 
conservative.  Over 80% of respondents were involved in one or no voluntary 
associations, a number that was somewhat lower than expected given the diverse range 
included in the measure. Similarly, fewer than ten percent of respondents were members 
of neighborhood associations. While social capital very often includes a respondent’s 
income and education level, these variables were used as controls. This was because the 
significance of education and income in both social capital and in affecting political 
behavior are so empirically verified that they do not need further empirical justification 
within the scope of this paper.12 
                                                            
12 For more information (to name a few) about the effects of income and education on political 
behavior, see: 
Dodson, Kyle. "The Return of the American Voter? Party Polarization and Voting Behavior, 
1988 to 2004." Sociological Perspectives 53.3 (2010): 443-49. JSTOR. Web. 3 Apr. 2014. 
Hillygus, D. Sunshine. "The Missing Link: Exploring the Relationship Between Higher 
Education and Political participation." Political Behavior 27.1 (2005): 25-47. JSTOR. Web. 03 
Apr. 2014. 
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The second model introduces independent variables representing the 
multidimensional nature of political alienation (as seen in Table 5.3). As previously  
discussed (see page 17), common measures of political alienation include the concepts of 
feelings of powerlessness to affect politics and meaninglessness of politics. Some 
measures include trust or mistrust of political institutions (Dean 1960; Southwell 2012). 
This was an intriguing concept as it makes intuitive sense, yet is not strongly supported 
by the literature. As such, I also determined that exploring the role (if any) of mistrust in 
political alienation could help to clarify the results of Dean and Southwell, and permit 
empirical findings to weigh in on this point. Regardless of this result, given that a more 
generalized form of trust is occasionally included in measures of social capital, this 
variable may still have something notable to tell us in this model (Nielson & Paxton 
2010; Quintelier 2008; Klofstad 2010). Mistrust13 is a fifty-point scaled  variable 
representing the sum of a respondent’s score on five 10-point measures of trust in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
aenger, Gerhart H. "Social Status and Political Behavior." American Journal of Sociology 51.2 
(1945): 103-13. JSTOR. Web. 03 Apr. 2014. 
13 In this case, mistrust must be distinguished from distrust. Mistrust is defined as the lack of trust 
in the specified institutions or groups, while distrust refers to active suspicion or doubt toward a 
group/person. Distinction is based on basic dictionary definitions. 
Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics of Alienation  (Independent) 
Variables 
Variable Mean Range SD 
Powerlessness 3.464 1-5 1.009 
Meaninglessness 3.060 1-5 1.078 
Mistrust 26.98 1-51 10.051 
Zero-Order Correlations for Alienation Variables 
Powerlessness Meaninglessness Mistrust 
Powerlessness 1 - - 
Meaninglessness 0.1541 1 - 
Mistrust 0.4547 0.1233 1 
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political institutions and groups which include: Congress, the Legal System, Politicians, 
the Supreme Court, and Political Parties. For this variable, a higher number indicates 
deeper mistrust, where a score of 1 indicates complete trust in all groups listed above. 
This index was composed based on theoretical relationships between each parent 
variable, and confirmed via exploratory factor analysis, which indicated that each parent 
variable for mistrust did unite under a single latent variable, which I term Mistrust.  
Powerlessness is measured by the respondent’s assessment that politicians are not 
concerned by the thoughts of people like the respondent. Meaninglessness was 
constructed to represent the respondent’s understanding of their own internal ability to 
comprehend, and thus influence political events or discourse. For this analysis, the 
variable was constructed based on the respondent’s assessment of how often politics is 
too complicated to understand what is occurring. Regarding the alienation measures, each 
variable is fairly normally distributed. The mean score for meaninglessness is a3.06, 
while powerlessness has a very slight skew toward feeling more powerless, with a mean 
score of 3.46. Mistrust also has a faint lean in favor of less trust in political institutions 
(with a mean score of 26.98). 
The third model included variables measuring the possibility that peers influence 
the respondent’s political participation (Table 5.4). In keeping with Ikeda, Kobayashi & 
Richey’s theory, I included a basic ordinal measure of the respondent’s number of close 
friends (ranging from none to more than ten), frequency of telephone communication 
(ranging from “Every Day” to less than “Once per month”), and frequency of political 
conversation with close friends (a four-point measure ranging from 1,“Usually”,  to 4, 
“Never”). Frequency of in-person contact with close friends is also included in the model, 
47 
 
and is measured with identical categories as frequency of political discussion. These 
measures were converted into binary dummy variables.14 
 A second version of the third model was run to test for moderation between 
political alienation variables and peer influence variables. However, due to dataset 
limitations, this model ran into some difficulties; most permutations either failed to yield 
significant results, or could not be parsimoniously created due to multicollinearity 
issues.15 Given the lack of significant results, the findings for the final analysis are not 
included in the main text of this thesis. 
 Finally, there are several considerations to keep in mind in understanding the 
results of these analyses. First, behavioral variables are estimated by the respondent post 
hoc, possibly by several months, and thus may be prone to a certain level of memory 
                                                            
14 Reference categories /variables are: “Respondent has 11 or more close friends”, “Respondent 
never talks on the phone with close friends”, “Respondent meets with close friends daily”, 
“Respondent rarely discusses politics with close friends”. 
15 I would strongly recommend future researchers to take time to address this issue, and consider 
employing some of the solutions recommended by York (2012). 
Table 5.4. Zero-Order Correlations Between Peer-Influence (Independent) Variables* 
and Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables 
Number 
of close 
friends 
(Ordinal) 
Frequency 
of phone 
commun. w/ 
close fri. 
Frequency 
of in-person 
meeting w/ 
close fri. 
Frequency 
of political 
disc.. w/ 
close fri. 
Mean Range SD 
Number of 
close friends 
(Ordinal) 
1 
   
3.63 1-6 1.18 
Frequency of 
phone comm. 
w/ close fri. 
-0.1695 1 
  
2.06 1-5 1.03 
Frequency of 
in-person meet 
w/ close fri. 
-0.1851 0.4569** 1 
 
2.43 1-5 1.06 
Frequency of 
pol. disc. w/ 
close fri. 
-0.0902 0.043 0.1049 1 2.76 1-4 0.91 
*Full table of correlations (including dummy variables used in analysis can be found in Appendix 2.  
**Some correlations were higher than preferred, but because the correlation between these important variables 
was not extremely high, the variables remained in the model, and robust standard errors were used to reduce the 
effects of collinearity. 
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error. Similarly, scalar variables (which may serve as the basis for indexes) such as levels 
of trust are also estimated by respondents, and may be prone to bias toward quintiles, 
ends, and so on. While the distribution of most of these measures is fairly normal, this 
possibility must be kept in mind. Sampling limitations have also introduced a certain 
level of error for generalizability of results. However, in order to improve the statistical 
validity of results, population weights were used in analysis. 
 
 
 
  
49 
 
VI. Results 
From examining the design of the three models of this study, we can immediately 
proceed to analysis of the results. Model 1 focused on predicting political participation 
based on social capital variables. These include frequency of attendance at religious 
services, experiences of lengthy unemployment, voluntary and neighborhood association 
membership, and the respondent’s placement on a liberal-conservative scale (to account 
for their ideological placement relative to the political administration in national office).  
Model 1 revealed a surprising lack of significance, given the weight the literature 
placed on social capital measures (Table 6.1). While religious service attendance weekly 
or less lacked significant effects, respondents who attended a service daily participated in 
60.4% fewer political acts than those who never attend religious services (p<0.001), all 
else constant. Political ideology had no significant effect, along with neighborhood 
association membership and experiences of long-term unemployment, when controlling 
for other factors.  Yet voluntary association membership had a strongly significant effect 
(p<.001); with each increase in type of association in which the respondent held 
membership, they also participated in about 37% more political acts, all else equal. 
The subsequent model (referred to as Model 2) was nested within the first, and 
added the three political alienation variables (see Table 6.1). To begin with, mistrust in 
political institutions was a fifty-point measure. The remaining two were five-point 
measures of respondent perceptions of political meaninglessness and powerlessness. 
Model two shows few changes in social capital variables. However, the effect of daily 
religious service attendance became more significant, indicating that daily churchgoers’ 
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number of political activities decreased by about half (54.5%), compared to those who 
never attend church, all else constant (p<0.001). Further, the effect of voluntary 
association activity decreased slightly. This time, all else equal, as the average 
respondent’s membership in types of voluntary associations increases, the number of 
Table 6.1: Summary of Nested Models of Political Participation as affected by Social 
Capital, Political Alienation and Peer Influence 
Dependent Variable: Number of Types 
of Political Acts. 
Model 1:  
Social Capital 
Model 2: 
Alienation 
Model 3: 
 Peer Influence 
Social Capital Variables:    
R Attends Relig. Service: Every Day 0.396*** 0.455*** 0.532*** 
 (0.231 - 0.679) (0.291 - 0.714) (0.372 - 0.762) 
R Attends Relig. Service: Weekly or  1.002 1.072 1.091 
More (0.801 - 1.253) (0.859 - 1.339) (0.882 - 1.349) 
R Attends Relig. Service: Monthly  1.042 1.100 1.107 
or Less (0.842 - 1.289) (0.893 - 1.355) (0.912 - 1.344) 
Voluntary Assoc. Member.  1.369*** 1.353*** 1.287*** 
(# of types of orgs.) (1.278 - 1.466) (1.263 - 1.449) (1.204 - 1.376) 
Alienation Variables:    
Powerlessness  0.893** 0.912** 
 (0.831 - 0.959) (0.851 - 0.977) 
Meaninglessness  0.943 0.956 
 (0.882 - 1.008) (0.900 - 1.015) 
Mistrust of political inst. (High   1.015*** 1.014*** 
# = Less Trust)  (1.007 - 1.023) (1.006 - 1.022) 
Peer Influence Variables:    
R meets w/ friends few times    1.238* 
Weekly   (1.027 - 1.491) 
R meets w/ friends few times per    1.129 
Month   (0.912 - 1.398) 
R meets w/ friends once per    0.885 
month or less   (0.669 - 1.170) 
R Usually talks politics w/ Friends   1.622*** 
   (1.299 - 2.025) 
R Sometimes talks politics w/    1.362*** 
Friends   (1.185 - 1.565) 
R Never talks politics w/ Friends   0.792* 
   (0.639 - 0.982) 
Constant 1.19 1.33 1.10 
N 721 721 721 
AIC  4.016 3.992 3.929 
BIC’ -51.841 -54.864 -41.321 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Difference of 3.037 in BIC' between model 1 and model 2 provides strong support for Model 2. 
Difference of 13.544 in BIC' between model 2 and model 3 provides very strong support for Model 3. 
Unstandardized Incidence-Rate Ratios presented with Confidence Intervals provided in parentheses. 
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political activities they participate in increases by 35%  (p<.001), 1.6% lower than model 
1. This could make sense, as over-investment in religious practice may leave little room 
for political activity.  
The alienation variables also offer interesting results, given the literature. While 
meaninglessness has no significant effect on political participation, as powerlessness 
increases, respondents participate in a lower number of political acts by a highly 
significant factor of about 11%, all else equal (p<.01). But even more interesting is that as 
mistrust grows, political participation also grows. Specifically, for every unit increase in 
mistrust, the number of political acts the respondent participates in increases by 1.5%, 
controlling for other factors (p<.001). Though this is a small percentage change, the large 
scalar nature of the mistrust variable indicates that this significant change can yield 
substantial results in respondents who occupy either extreme of the variable. Further, a 
test comparing the quality of these models yields strong support for model two, citing a 
BIC’ difference of over three points in favor of model 2. In summary, introducing the 
political alienation variables slightly increases the effect of daily religious attendance 
(though the relationship remains negative), and slightly decreases the effect of voluntary 
association membership (though the relationship remains positive). 
Considering the quality difference between these two models, we can then 
examine what kind of meaningful difference occurs when we introduce peer influence 
variables, which create our third model, also nested within the previous model, as seen in 
Table 6.1. While the respondent’s approximate number of close friends and frequency of 
telephone communication had no significant effect16, frequency of in-person meetings 
and political discussions did. Though meeting with friends a few times a month or less 
                                                            
16 See Appendix 1 for a table of full regression results. 
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had no significant effect, respondents who meet with their close friends a few times per 
week participated in a 23.8% greater number of political acts than those who met with 
friends every day, all else equal (p<.05). Given these results, we see that the effect of 
simple in-person contact with friends is limited. 
Focusing on the effects of political discussion with friends as represented in 
model 3, however, makes a significant difference in participation. Respondents who 
usually discussed politics with friends participated in 62.2% more political acts than 
those who rarely partake in such discussions (p<.001), and even those who only 
sometimes discussed politics participated in a 32% greater number of political activities 
than those who rarely discuss such topics, all else equal (p<.001). The value of political 
discussion in any amount is further supported by the finding that respondents who never 
discuss politics with friends engaged in 20.8% fewer political activities than those who 
rarely (but still do) talk about political topics with friends. Given these findings, then, we 
can see that social activity in general among friends does not necessarily lead to higher 
political participation, in contrast to Ikeda, Kobayashi and Richey’s argument. 
Also in this model, we again see the effect of social capital variables change. 
When controlling for the additional peer influence variables (see Table 6.1), respondents 
who attend religious services every day participate in 53% as many political acts (p<.001) 
as someone who never attends religious services, though this effect is 7.2% as many 
political acts higher than in model two. Further, we see that the effect of voluntary 
association membership diminishes further (though it remains positive): as the respondent 
becomes a member of more types of voluntary associations, the number of types of 
political acts they engage in increases by 28.7% (p<.001), all else constant.  
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However, we also see the effect of powerlessness change when controlling for 
peer influence. Controlling for all other factors, for very unit increase in powerlessness, 
the respondents participation in the number of political acts only decreases by 8.8% 
(p<.01). There is no substantive change in the effects of mistrust. Further, comparing the 
quality of model 3 to model 2 indicates that while model 3 is somewhat better, the BIC’ 
provides only weak support for model 3. This may be because many of the peer influence 
variables had no significant effect on political participation. But this may be something to 
keep in mind for the future. 
This brings us to our final model, termed Model 3.1 (omitted from table of results 
due to lack of significance - See Appendix for full results) because the only change 
introduced is the possibility of interaction effects between the peer influence variables 
and the political alienation variables. However, this model found no significant 
interaction between alienation variables and frequency of political discussion, a 
somewhat surprising result given the highly significant nature of each parent variable 
(with the exception of internal self-efficacy). Another interesting characteristic of this 
model is that nearly every previously significant variable (including peer influence and 
alienation variables) lost their significance, with the exception of daily religious 
attendance, number of voluntary association memberships, and weekly meetings with 
friends, and mistrust of political institutions. None of these variables reveal substantive 
shifts from their strength in the previous models.   
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VII. Discussion 
This analysis revealed findings that both support and conflict with the works of 
others. Yet these results provide an opening for a meaningful theoretical discussion of 
alienation and social capital. A majority of social capital variables had no significant 
effects on political participation, including neighborhood association membership 
(surprising, given the well-established effects of volunteerism).17 The significant effect of 
voluntary associations, observed by others, is also supported by my voluntary association 
membership variable, which managed to maintain a strong effect across all models. 
Future models may do well to include measures of civic engagement in analyses separate 
from political participation. Such may provide more telling results. 
Yet the negative (or insignificant) effects of religious attendance were also a 
surprise, as one might expect high religious attendance to lead to increased opportunity to 
become engaged through exposure to congregation members, or political calls-to-action 
made during sermons. Instead, I found that very high religious attendance was strongly 
negatively related to political participation. This could be due to over-investment of time 
in religious activity leading to a lack of time for political activity – such a relationship 
may turn out to be curvilinear. A potential alternative explanation for this observation 
could be that high religious involvement could relate to higher volunteerism of types that 
may not be captured in my measure, such as community service, fundraisers for at-risk 
congregation members, or community building projects. However, a more likely 
explanation could be that this finding is confirming that of Quintelier, who argued that 
certain types of voluntary associations (including church activities) may depress turnout 
                                                            
17  Janoski, T., Musick, M., & Wilson, J. (September 01, 1998). Being Volunteered? The Impact 
of Social Participation and Pro-Social Attitudes on Volunteering. Sociological Forum, 13, 3.) 
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because they have a goal set that is often more “entertainment-oriented”(2008). Given 
how high church involvement can foster civic skills, and that many churches emphasize 
service, this could indicate the need for a more specific variable set for religion and 
religious associations.  
If we were to follow Ikeda, Kobayashi and Richey’s theory, then peer influence 
played a substantially lower role in political participation than expected. But it shouldn’t 
be overshadowed, for the effect is still positive and significant. Simple, general 
engagement with friends (frequency of visits or communication) played little or no 
significant role in political behavior. Those who met with friends a couple times weekly 
did have a significant, positive effect on the model. Though this provides weak evidence 
for Ikeda, Kobayashi & Richey’s argument (as they claimed that any type of social 
engagement would encourage political activity through casual discussions), the 
significance of the political talk variable provides much stronger support for Quintelier 
(2008) and Klofstad (2010). Indeed, political discussions between friends appeared to 
have a strong effect on participation, while failure (on the respondent’s part) to do so had 
a distinctly negative effect on participation. This leads me to conclude that the presence 
of simple social engagements is of extremely limited value: not all social engagements 
are equal in the arena of political participation. Instead, a more specific focus on the types 
of voluntary associations a person is involved with, and the level of political salience of 
their relationships would provide better predictive power. This certainly makes some 
intuitive sense, as many people do not consider politics a central part of their lives- even 
if they are politically active, this may not serve as a basis for the majority of their 
relationships. Regarding the model testing for interactions, there was no sign of 
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significant moderation between peer influence variables and alienation variables, and 
though the model fared much better from BIC' testing, nearly all previously significant 
variables lost their significance.  
The results regarding alienation are the most interesting, and perhaps the most 
promising. This study included measures of three facets of alienation: powerlessness, 
meaninglessness, and to test its connection, mistrust. Meaninglessness failed to 
significantly influence political participation in this model, but powerlessness and 
mistrust maintained significant effects through all models. Interestingly, while high 
powerlessness related to reduced political participation, high mistrust appears to correlate 
with higher political participation. This raises interesting questions regarding whether 
mistrust should be regarded as a subtype of alienation. Contrary to Southwell’s claims, 
mistrust behaved quite differently from my other political alienation variables. A follow-
up exploratory factor analysis helped to illuminate this issue: while powerlessness and 
meaninglessness loaded onto the same factor, mistrust placed a higher loading on a 
second factor, indicating that a different latent variable was connected to mistrust of 
political institutions. Mistrust in this case appeared to encourage participation, an effect 
that supported the findings of Bowler and Karp (2004): where increased mistrust led to 
higher political participation, respondents felt compelled to change a system they felt was 
untrustworthy.18 
This is a fascinating finding, and it raises interesting questions about the role of 
this type of mistrust in studies of political behavior. While the literature indicated that 
generalized trust was more valuable for social capital measures, we can ask whether this 
                                                            
18 Bowler, Shaun, and Jeffrey A. Karp. "Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Government." 
Political Behavior 26.3 (2004): 271-87. JSTOR. Web. 12 Apr. 2014. 
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subtype of mistrust might be useful as a control for studies of alienation or social 
capital’s relationship to political participation. An excellent follow-up to better 
understand the connections between all of these variables could be a structural equation 
model with latent variables. Using more refined measurements with this combination of 
concepts could reveal more telling results regarding the more negative elements of 
political participation. 
Finally, there may have been some support for the effects of a multidimensional 
alienation on political participation, but this need not include mistrust as a subtype - it 
may be best to include and test other subtypes of alienation on participation. Given that 
Meaninglessness failed to produce any significant effect, researchers may find better luck 
considering powerlessness and mistrust in their models. This is better in keeping with 
Balch’s findings regarding internal and external self-efficacy, a term that has enjoyed 
greater popularity in contemporary socio-political studies, and may better capture those 
facets of behavior which alienation was supposed to measure.  
From this treatment of alienation, we can see why it should be valuable to 
differentiate between bases of a latent variable, as some of my facets of alienation did not 
fit with the latent concept and would have served better as an isolated variable. The 
positive effects of mistrust reminds us that some level of skepticism is likely healthy for a 
functioning democracy. Given that a slight majority of respondents are inclined toward 
mistrust, we can conservatively interpret a positive outcome for engagement from 
skeptical populations, a finding that also supports Bennet’s (2013) conclusion that 
skepticism is healthy for democracy.  
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Table 7.1. Hypothesis Confirmation and Falsifications 
 Confirmed Falsified 
Social Capital 
H3:  If a respondent has high social capital, then they will engage in 
more political activities. 
H3 x 
Political Alienation 
H1: If the respondent experiences high powerlessness or 
meaninglessness, they will engage in fewer political activities. 
H2: If the respondent is mistrustful of political institutions, they will 
engage in a greater number of political activities. 
H1, H2 x 
Peer Influence 
H4: If a respondent frequently communicates with close friends, then 
they will engage in more political activities. 
H5: If a respondent frequently visits close friends, then they will 
engage in more political activities. 
H6: If a respondent frequently discusses politics with close friends, 
then they will engage in more political activities. 
H5, H6 H4 
Conclusions based on Table 6.1 
Before approaching the conclusion, however, it is important to understand these 
interesting results in the context of the hypotheses as originally stated (see page 36). As 
seen in Table 7.1, Social capital variables revealed interesting findings. While not every 
variable was significant, it is worth noting that those variables that were significant were 
those most closely tied to the literature, particularly those involving voluntary 
associations and religious attendance. Religious service attendance displayed some 
significance, but in the opposite direction expected. However, voluntary association 
membership results were consistent with hypotheses and the literature. This indicates that 
the issue may be more a matter of measurement, as this data set initially appeared lacking 
in ideal Social Capital variables and some researchers have argued for more nuanced 
measures of religious factors in politics. Given this finding, it is fair to conclude that 
these results largely support the value of Social Capital as a significant factor influencing 
political participation. This puts us in a good place, as it indicates that this data does not 
substantially diverge from the larger academic consensus.   
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The first Alienation hypothesis, (H1) was also largely confirmed as Powerlessness 
had a significant, consistent effect (though meaninglessness did not return a significant 
result). However, the second hypothesis was strongly supported, as mistrust returned 
significant results consistency. Given previous findings in the literature, Meaninglessness 
would likely become significant with improved measurement. Combined with this 
model’s BIC’ score, this finding indicates some positive support for including measures 
of these concepts in models of political behavior. 
The Peer Influence hypotheses also were mostly supported, two of three 
hypotheses returned a significant result. Of particular interest is the strong significance of 
the “discusses politics” variable. This strongly supports the findings of Klofstad (2010), 
Lazarsfeld (1939), and Quintelier (2008). While hypothesis four was not confirmed, the 
strong significance of the findings for hypotheses 5 and 6 (and the very strong BIC’ 
score) shows that this concept strengthens explanations of political participation.  
Unfortunately, given the cross-sectional nature of this data, I cannot positively 
establish the causal order of these findings. As always, this is an area where time-series 
data would be a deeply valuable resource. This data set is also limited in terms of 
variables available to assess social capital, while more comprehensive data sets such as 
the ANES lack the variety of political activity variables that makes my study possible. 
Such is a difficult conflict, but this issue could serve as an indicator of why the ANES 
data sets need to include more accurate political activity variables: to allow for optimum 
studies of participation, social capital, and alienation. Such would also (in subsequent 
years) aid in addressing the need for time-series data.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
This study sought to explore the role that political alienation could play in 
improving explanations of political behavior, to what extent it may explain that behavior, 
and how this might be moderated by peer influence. I summarized the literature on these 
topics, as well as the information on social capital, a concept often used to explain 
political participation, and which I used as a comparison to alienation. I considered recent 
social capital and resource-based theories to explain political behavior, before positing 
my own theory of participatory alienation. I then conducted the analysis itself, finding 
that my multidimensional concept of alienation may be better understood in terms of its 
separate parts: powerlessness, meaninglessness, and mistrust of political institutions.  
Studies of alienation gained significant popularity between the 1950s and early 
1980s, where the theory developed along several disciplinary lines. While there was a 
vague consensus about what sub-concepts could be included as facets of alienation, 
empirical support widely failed to definitively support or falsify the use or validity of 
political alienation (Seeman 1975). While the use of the term (particularly "political 
alienation") has declined in more recent decades, it appears that rather than experience 
full-blown disappearance, political alienation's component parts have been found more 
useful individually than as a unified concept.  
The results of this study go to support the separation of sub-concepts of alienation 
in attempting to explain political participation, which could work in tandem with social 
capital models. A key aspect of this is the finding that while some more recent literature 
makes an intriguing case for including mistrust as a parent variable for the latent concept 
of alienation, an exploratory factor analysis of my measures suggests that mistrust loads 
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onto a different latent variable, and its results in the regression analysis also indicate that 
mistrust behaves differently than powerlessness and meaninglessness. Yet its strong 
significance through both models and large swath of supporting literature indicates that 
trust/ mistrust remains a useful concept for the explanation of a number of social and 
political variables.  
Powerlessness and meaninglessness also raised interesting questions from this 
analysis. An examination of the literature suggested to me that powerlessness and 
meaninglessness, having lost popularity with the use of alienation, may have received a 
"facelift" in more recent literature and are now being used as the concepts of internal and 
external self-efficacy (see Seeman 1975, Southwell 2012, and Balch 1974). This 
continued usefulness of the concepts is reinforced by my highly, consistently significant 
results for the use of powerlessness, which makes theoretical sense: one's perceived 
ability to influence political events or outcomes would intuitively have an effect on their 
inclination to engage in political acts. However, the lack of significance of my 
meaninglessness variable also indicates (in light of more supportive literature) that this 
model may need improved measures, particularly of this concept. 
Fortunately, the results of this project do encourage future research. Given this 
thesis' reliance on latent measures, a more effective type of analysis may be found 
through structural equation modeling (SEM) with latent variables. Such may produce 
more nuanced, accurate results, and permit for more a more meaningful study, especially 
as there have been very few SEM studies of alienation (one example can be seen in 
Denters & Geurts 1993). In this follow-up, more refined measures of alienation and 
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social capital may also be possible, which may improve the validity of the social capital 
results in this study. 
Alienation is a concept that has excited a large amount of multidisciplinary study, 
but has lately suffered from ambiguity, overuse, and since then, disuse. Yet if the latent 
concept is of questionable utility, its parent variables maintain widespread value and use, 
a dynamic that indicates the need for better theoretical and empirical understanding. This 
thesis yielded informative results and has provided great educational value for my 
understanding of these base concepts. Future research will hopefully clarify these 
concepts for other sociologists and serve to improve their use, or else better explain the 
reason for their disuse.  
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X. Appendix 
 
A1. Zero-Order Correlations Between Social Capital Variables 
 R 
attends 
church 
daily 
R 
attends 
church 
once 
weekly 
or more 
R 
attends 
church 
once 
monthly 
or less 
R 
never 
attends 
church 
Voluntary 
Assoc. 
Memb. (# 
of types 
of orgs.) 
R's 
Liberal/ 
Conserv. 
Placement 
(0=Lib.) 
Neighbor-
hood 
Assoc. 
member 
R has 
ever 
been 
Unempl. 
For 3 
mo.+ 
R attends 
church daily 1        
R attends 
church once/ 
weekly+ 
-0.0513 1       
R attends 
church once 
monthly or 
less 
-0.0719 -0.7303 1      
R never 
attends 
church* 
-0.0294 -0.299 -0.4195 1     
Voluntary 
Association 
Membership 
(# of types of 
orgs.) 
0.0434 0.2786 -0.1945 -0.1076 1    
R's Liberal/ 
Conserv. 
Placement 
(0=Lib.) 
-0.0738 0.1814 -0.1032 -0.0834 0.0615 1   
Neighborhood 
Assoc. 
member 
-0.0835 -0.0186 -0.0257 0.0446 0.1902 0.015 1  
R has ever 
been Unempl. 
For 3mo. + 
0.0364 -0.058 -0.0268 0.0328 -0.0859 -0.0547 -0.0258 1 
*Reference category: the others are binary “Dummy Variables”. 
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A3. Table of full regression results. 
Nested Models of Political Participation as affected by Social Capital, Political Alienation and 
Peer Influence, and Peer Influence Moderation 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of Types of 
Political Acts. 
Model 1:  
Social Capital 
Model 2: 
Alienation 
Model 3: 
 Peer 
Influence 
Model 3.1: 
Peer Influence 
Moderation 
Social Capital 
Variables: 
    
R Attends Relig. 
Service: Every Day 
0.402** 0.460*** 0.532*** 0.495** 
 (0.234 - 0.692) (0.292 - 0.724) (0.372 - 0.762) (0.322 - 0.759) 
R Attends Relig. 
Service: Weekly or  
1.003 1.090 1.091 1.093 
More (0.803 - 1.252) (0.875 - 1.359) (0.882 - 1.349) (0.881 - 1.355) 
R Attends Relig. 
Service: Monthly  
1.045 1.109 1.107 1.118 
or Less (0.845 - 1.292) (0.901 - 1.364) (0.912 - 1.344) (0.919 - 1.360) 
Voluntary Assoc. 
Member.  
1.372*** 1.350*** 1.287*** 1.294*** 
(# of types of orgs.) (1.281 - 1.470) (1.261 - 1.445) (1.204 - 1.376) (1.210 - 1.383) 
R's Liberal-Conserv. 
Ideology  
0.989 0.993 0.984 0.986 
(0=Liberal) (0.957 - 1.022) (0.962 - 1.026) (0.954 - 1.015) (0.956 - 1.018) 
R is Neighborhood 
Assoc. Member 
1.045 1.064 1.008 1.011 
 (0.844 - 1.295) (0.858 - 1.318) (0.817 - 1.243) (0.817 - 1.251) 
R Ever Unemployed for 
3 Months  
1.019 1.007 1.005 1.009 
or More (0.880 - 1.180) (0.871 - 1.164) (0.875 - 1.154) (0.879 - 1.158) 
Alienation Variables:     
Powerlessness  0.890** 0.912** 0.948 
  (0.829 - 0.956) (0.851 - 0.977) (0.774 - 1.162) 
Meaninglessness  0.940 0.956 1.001 
  (0.879 - 1.005) (0.900 - 1.015) (0.831 - 1.206) 
Mistrust of political 
inst. (High  
 1.015*** 1.014*** 1.028* 
# = Less Trust)  (1.007 - 1.023) (1.006 - 1.022) (1.003 - 1.053) 
Peer Influence 
Variables: 
    
R has no close friends   1.865 1.727 
   (0.766 - 4.540) (0.726 - 4.107) 
R has 1 or 2 Close 
Friends 
  1.048 1.039 
   (0.832 - 1.322) (0.822 - 1.313) 
R has 3 to 5 Close 
Friends 
  1.017 1.019 
   (0.856 - 1.207) (0.858 - 1.208) 
R has 6 to 10 Close Fri.   1.101 1.108 
   (0.919 - 1.319) (0.925 - 1.326) 
R talks w/ friends few 
times  
  0.961 0.977 
weekly   (0.820 - 1.126) (0.835 - 1.143) 
70 
 
3. Table of Full Regression Results (continued) 
Nested Models of Political Participation as affected by Social Capital, Political Alienation and 
Peer Influence, and Peer Influence Moderation 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of Types of 
Political Acts. 
Model 1:  
Social Capital 
Model 2: 
Alienation 
Model 3: 
 Peer 
Influence 
Model 3.1: 
Peer Influence 
Moderation
R talks w/ friends few 
times per  
  0.881 0.899 
Month   (0.719 - 1.081) (0.733 - 1.102) 
R talks w/ friends once 
per month  
  1.068 1.074 
or less   (0.808 - 1.411) (0.815 - 1.416) 
R Usually talks politics 
w/ Friends 
  1.622*** 1.210 
   (1.299 - 2.025) (0.524 - 2.793) 
R Sometimes talks 
politics w/  
  1.362*** 1.179 
Friends   (1.185 - 1.565) (0.771 - 1.803) 
R Never talks politics w/ 
Friends 
  0.792* 0.926 
   (0.639 - 0.982) (0.603 - 1.422) 
R meets w/ friends few 
times  
  1.238* 1.229* 
Weekly   (1.027 - 1.491) (1.020 - 1.481) 
R meets w/ friends few 
times per  
  1.129 1.133 
Month   (0.912 - 1.398) (0.915 - 1.402) 
R meets w/ friends once 
per  
  0.885 0.886 
month or less   (0.669 - 1.170) (0.673 - 1.167) 
Moderation:     
Moderation: Mistrust x 
Talks  
   0.995 
Politics    (0.986 - 1.004) 
Moderation: External 
Self Efficacy  
   1.017 
x Talks Politics    (0.939 - 1.101) 
Moderation: Internal 
Self Efficacy  
   0.982 
x Talks Politics    (0.919 - 1.049) 
Controls:     
R’s Political Party ID 
(1=Strong  
1.003 1.008 0.993 0.994 
Rep.) (0.970 - 1.038) (0.974 - 1.042) (0.961 - 1.026) (0.962 - 1.028) 
R Income between 
$15K and  
0.940 0.959 0.927 0.922 
$29,999.99 (0.727 - 1.216) (0.747 - 1.232) (0.717 - 1.199) (0.712 - 1.194) 
R Income between 
$30K and  
1.049 1.063 1.059 1.039 
$49,999.99 (0.817 - 1.348) (0.839 - 1.347) (0.832 - 1.347) (0.817 - 1.321) 
R Income between 
$50K and  
1.016 0.987 1.052 1.037 
$74,999.99 (0.783 - 1.317) (0.768 - 1.269) (0.814 - 1.359) (0.800 - 1.345) 
R Income between 
$75K and  
1.053 1.069 1.023 1.010 
$99,999.99 (0.803 - 1.382) (0.822 - 1.389) (0.790 - 1.323) (0.781 - 1.307) 
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3. Table of Full Regression Results (continued) 
Nested Models of Political Participation as affected by Social Capital, Political Alienation and 
Peer Influence, and Peer Influence Moderation 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of Types of 
Political Acts. 
Model 1:  
Social Capital 
Model 2: 
Alienation 
Model 3: 
 Peer 
Influence 
Model 3.1: 
Peer Influence 
Moderation
R Income $100K or 
more 
1.169 1.219 1.214 1.179 
 (0.847 - 1.614) (0.884 - 1.680) (0.886 - 1.664) (0.863 - 1.610) 
R has Some College, or 
Bus.,  
1.625*** 1.604*** 1.501*** 1.494*** 
tech., or vocational 
school 
(1.367 - 1.930) (1.352 - 1.902) (1.270 - 1.774) (1.262 - 1.768) 
R is College Graduate 1.966*** 1.931*** 1.727*** 1.728*** 
 (1.594 - 2.425) (1.574 - 2.367) (1.417 - 2.104) (1.419 - 2.105) 
R has Post-graduate  1.926*** 1.826*** 1.766*** 1.714*** 
training/Professional 
School 
(1.508 - 2.459) (1.440 - 2.316) (1.401 - 2.226) (1.356 - 2.167) 
R’s age as of 2005 1.001 1.001 1.002 1.002 
 (0.997 - 1.006) (0.996 - 1.005) (0.998 - 1.007) (0.998 - 1.006) 
R is Male 1.263*** 1.236** 1.165* 1.169* 
 (1.104 - 1.445) (1.083 - 1.412) (1.023 - 1.327) (1.027 - 1.330) 
R Race is Asian 0.678* 0.741 0.773 0.795 
 (0.480 - 0.958) (0.527 - 1.042) (0.517 - 1.156) (0.549 - 1.152) 
R Race is Black  0.902 0.844 0.895 0.892 
 (0.721 - 1.129) (0.671 - 1.062) (0.715 - 1.121) (0.713 - 1.115) 
R Race is Hispanic  0.742 0.726* 0.790 0.790 
 (0.548 - 1.003) (0.546 - 0.965) (0.604 - 1.034) (0.604 - 1.032) 
R Race is Other 
Nonwhite 
0.640 0.611 0.673 0.716 
 (0.380 - 1.078) (0.372 - 1.004) (0.411 - 1.100) (0.425 - 1.205) 
R lives in Urban Area 1.120 1.097 1.108 1.111 
 (0.976 - 1.284) (0.958 - 1.258) (0.972 - 1.263) (0.974 - 1.267) 
AIC 4.016 3.992 3.929 . 
BIC’ -51.841 -54.864 -41.321 . 
Constant 1.177 1.34 1.2 0.88 
N 744 732 722 721 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Unstandardized Incidence-Rate Ratios presented with Confidence Intervals provided in 
parentheses. 
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